UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

UNITED STATES ARMY AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

by

(b) (6)

Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Naval Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signat (b) (6)

5 March 1984
22 June 1984

Paper directed by
(b) (6)
Instructor, Department of Naval Operations

Approved by:

(b) (6)

9 MAR 84

Abstract of

UNITED STATES ARMY AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

This study investigates the U. S. Army's current capability to conduct amphibious operations. After action reports of URGENT FURY, the operation into Grenada in October 1983, seem to indicate that the Army is not adequately prepared to make joint, amphibious assaults with the Marines and the Navy. This study concludes that, as a result of geographic and political considerations, the leaders of the Army must reconsider the value of amphibious warfare in future conflicts regardless of size and incorporate it into Army thinking alongside more glamorous topics like Airland Battle. In the long-term, this will require greater emphasis on training and joint exercises, a revitalization of the fleet of landing craft, and a reorientation of its use and the mission of the waterborne units who man them to include not only Logistics-Over-the-Shore but amphibious assaults as well. In the meantime, the 1st and 2d Battalions (Ranger), 75th Infantry are organized, trained, and equipped for, and doctrinally committed to, amphibious assaults, particularly if they take place in crises on the lower end of the conflict spectrum. As were the Rangers in World War II, the Rangers of today are ready to lead the way as the spearheads for amphibious assaults.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

UNITED STATES ARMY AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem. On 25 October 1983, Rangers from the 1st and 2d Battalions (Ranger), 75th Infantry made combat jumps onto the island of Grenada to secure the Point Salines Airport as a part of the joint operation URGENT FURY.[1] True to the legacy handed down from their predecessors in World War II, the Rangers had spearheaded another assault against a hostile shore. The original Rangers, organized in 1942 as naval raiders in the mold of the British Commandos, would not, however, have recognized two important aspects of the operation: the modern Rangers used parachutes rather than landing craft to come ashore, and, assigned the southern half of the island, they were not truly integrated with the United States Marine amphibious force making a landing in the northern sector.[2]

The two obvious differences between URGENT FURY and the landings by Rangers at Normandy and Leyte, for example, highlight problems in joint operations in general and amphibious operations in particular that persist today despite the intense scrutiny given to the aborted attempt to rescue the

American hostages in Iran and the costly recovery of the crew members of the Mayaguez and the emphasis given to the possibility of conflict in Central Command's area of responsibility. First and most fundamental, the United States Army is simply not prepared in any meaningful way to participate in amphibious operations; in 1948, the United States Army, passed primary responsibility for the development and execution of the doctrine so successfully utilized in World War II to the Marine Corps and to date has not indicated a great deal of official interest in regaining a greater degree of control.[3] Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seem reluctant, if URGENT FURY can be considered a precedent, to commit ground forces of the Army and the Marines to a contingency operation without taking extraordinary steps to keep them separated and thus to reduce the possibility of interference during the assault.[4] These considerations aside, the political realities of the polycentric world and the wide-ranging priorities of United States' policy in Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean dictate that the United States Army must be prepared to conduct joint amphibious operations either with the Marines or the U. S. Navy alone.

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES ARMY AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Although the term amphibious operations--attacks "launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore"--is generally associated with the United States Marine Corps, the United States Army, because of the number of amphibious assaults conducted from the Mexican War through World War II, has an equal historical claim to experience in their execution.[1] Since World War II, however, the Army--and the Marine Corps for that matter--has participated in only one major amphibious assault at Inchon, Korea, in 1950. Although the Marines are currently the primary practitioners of amphibious warfare and the opportunities for utilizing this expertise have been few, current joint doctrine will, and present-day political and geographic realities may, dictate that the United States Army be prepared on short notice to execute an amphibious or joint operation with the Marines or perhaps with the Navy alone. The stakes of peace and national security are too high for the leaders of the Army to be content to let only their counterparts in the Marine Corps master the techniques of amphibious warfare.

The political and geographic conditions in World War II

that forced the Army to encroach on what was at the time the doctrinal preserve of the Marine Corps--amphibious operations--must not simply be relegated to historical footnotes. During World War II, the Army found it necessary to utilize amphibious assaults as a means of gaining footholds in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France and of leapfrogging through the Southwest Pacific toward Japan. American ground forces simply could not defeat the Axis Powers without first landing on shores under their control. By the end of the war, 36 Army divisions had conducted with the United States Navy some fifty major amphibious assaults; an additional six were joint landings with the Marines. The Marines by comparison made only 10 landings with the Navy alone in the Pacific.[2]

To prepare the divisions for assaults in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, the Army Corps of Engineers organized an Engineer Amphibian Command to train four Engineer Amphibian Brigades which, in turn, first trained divisions at Amphibious Training Centers run by Army Ground Forces and then supported them in landings throughout the war. In the Southwest Pacific, these brigades, redesignated Engineer Special Brigades, not only offloaded supplies but ferried troops ashore in Army landing craft as well.[3] In a future, "come as you are" war, the United States Army simply will not have the time the planners and trainers in World War II had to shift doctrinal and training priorities. The lessons of that last global war

seem to indicate that Army planners must take nothing for granted when preparing capabilities to prosecute the next one, should it ever come.

The current polycentric international order and the bipolar confrontation between the ideologically and economically opposed camps of the United States and the Soviet Union present the American military with a potential conflict spectrum that ranges from nuclear war to terrorism. Major General Louis C. Menetrey summarized the challenge in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in 1982:

> We find that the probability of a type of conflict occurring is the opposite of the risk. The highest risk is in the theater nuclear, strategic, and major conventional area, with the highest probability of occurrence being in the low end of the spectrum with terrorism and unconventional warfare. Therefore, we must tailor forces to fight in all of the types of conflicts in which we find ourselves in defense of the national interest of the United States.[4]

Amphibious operations provide the planners another alternative as they prepare strategies and plans to meet each of the possible threats to the security of the United States.

Each conflict scenario provides the opportunity for amphibious warfare. Even in a general war with the Soviet Union in Europe--one of the least probable conflicts--without adequate warning, reinforcements may find aerial and sea ports of debarkation unusable and lines of communications challenged by enemy air and naval assets. Under these unfavorable conditions, a landing from the sea may be the only way to

insure the survivability of NATO forces locked in combat with the Soviets. In addition, follow-on Army divisions may very well have to exploit Marine landings on either the northern or southern flanks of NATO.

In a global war, which a war with the Soviet Union must surely become, the possibility exists that Central Command will have to confront Soviet forces and those of its allies in Southwest Asia. In such a case, the 24th Infantry and the 101st Airmobile/Air Assault Divisions could be called on to make amphibious assaults to support the Marines or to exploit tactical opportunities elsewhere.[5] Smaller power projections such as Grenada--one of the most probable types of conflict--obviously lend themselves to amphibious landings. With such scenarios possible, the Army simply cannot assume that its forces can make unopposed landings in a future conflict of any size.

With the Army's proud heritage of successful amphibious operations in World War II and the vagaries of future warfare in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since the end of that war, have charged the United States Army with responsibilities for the conduct of amphibious warfare. JCS Pub 2 specifically delineates four tasks:

> a. Organizing, equipping, and providing Army forces for joint amphibious operations.
> b. Providing for the training of such forces in accordance with doctrines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
> c. Developing, in coordination with the other Services,

> doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations. . . . d. Participating with the other Services in joint amphibious training and exercises as mutually agreed by the Services concerned.[6]

Despite these responsibilities, since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, "when the Marine Corps was given official blessing as the sole developer of amphibious doctrine, the Army turned its back on the subject and walked away from it."[7] Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1984, suggested this attitude still prevails as it specifically tied only the Marine Corps to the mission of amphibious warfare.[8] U. S. Army doctrine reflects this official attitude.

U. S. Army doctrine concentrates on land combat and, as a consequence, devotes very little attention, if any, to strategic deployment under hostile conditions. Current amphibious doctrine for the armed forces is joint and is contained in Field Manual (FM) 31-11; the Army's counterpart is FM 31-12 published in 1962. Of greater significance, the authors of FM 100-5, the bible of Army operational doctrine, do not make even a passing reference to amphibious operations. In discussing strategic deployment for a contingency operation, they state, as if it were a routine matter of no great concern, that "The location, nature, and intensity of the conflict will determine the composition of units needed and how they will be phased during deployment."[9] They are in good company for

neither Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, whose Annual Report for FY 1984 proudly hails the capabilities of the eight, recently acquired SL-7 fast cargo ships, nor Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. whose joint statement with former Chief of Staff Edward C. Meyer lauds the Army's Logistics-Over-the-Shore program, address the problem of how soldiers and their equipment will get ashore from these or other transports, before they need to be resupplied, should the chosen beachhead or port prove to be defended.[10]

Such thinking seems to rest on the assumptions that forward-deployed forces or Marines afloat will be able to protect administrative landings from either hostile threats or that intelligence sources will be able to provide warning indicators that will allow American units to deploy before hostile forces can interfere. Either assumption may prove shortsighted, if not fatal, at the time of execution of a critical contingency operation. Secretary Weinberger readily acknowledges that a "rapid deployment capability" is needed precisely "for those areas of the world in which the U. S. has little or no nearby military infrastructure or, in some cases, maintains no presence at all."[11]

A possible scenario for Southwest Asia outlined by Admiral Holloway, the former Chief of Naval Operations, in fact, breathes life into the first assumption. He postulates that troops airlifted from the United States will linkup with

equipment delivered by SL-7s in friendly ports. In the event that such facilities are not available, he envisions that Marines from the Marine Amphibious Unit positioned in the Indian Ocean about 50 % of the time will secure both aerial and sea ports of debarkation.[12] His scenario stops short of stating what would be happen should the Marine force not be readily available or prove to be inadequate to the task. It is at that point that Army units with amphibious capability must gain forcible entry to a hostile shore. Amphibious doctrine, therefore, must have at least parity with that of topical interest, such as Airland Battle, or the execution of the latter may be shortlived, in Europe for example, or even irrelevant in Southwest Asia.

Should the leaders of the Army decide to commit it to joint or amphibious operations, they will encounter the problem not only of strategic mobility but tactical mobility as well. At the strategic level, the issue is a combination of time, distance, and resources available to haul personnel and heavy equipment around the globe. The Department of Defense is attempting to remedy these shortcomings. The first alternative is prepositioning equipment in Europe (POMCUS) and in the Indian Ocean aboard 17 chartered merchant ships which are part of the Near Term Prepositioning Force. Second, the Maritime Administration and the Navy are working to build up both the Merchant Marine and the Military Sealift Command. A specific

program of great importance is the conversion of the eight SL-7s mentioned by Mr. Weinberger and Admiral Holloway. Sailing at 33 knots, these ships will be able to carry "the majority of the unit equipment--tanks, artillery, wheeled vehicles, helicopters--needed for two Army heavy mechanized or armored divisions" to Europe from the East Coast in four days and to the Indian Ocean from the West Coast in eleven days. Each of these ships can carry the equivalent of 150 sorties of C-5A aircraft.[13] These measures, as they become effective, will greatly alleviate the problems now encountered with strategic deployments.

The availability of strategic lift solves only half of the overall problem of getting Army forces into position to counter threats to U. S. security. The inability of reinforcements to land immediately where required will necessitate the availability of landing craft to transport them ashore. Although the Army's fleet of landing craft is largely obsolescent and is prepared to perform only the mission of Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS), sufficient serviceable boats exist in the short term to provide some lift if they remain prepositioned in England and Okinawa, are also placed in other likely areas of operation, such as the Indian Ocean, or are readily available for movement aboard SEABEEs or LASH barge ships should a contingency materialize that requires their use.[14] A combination of both will provide greater

responsiveness.

The older beaching craft and amphibians currently available are: 213 Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM-8), which can transport 200 combat loaded troops or 53.5 long tons of cargo, 93 Landing Craft, Utility (LCU), (300 combat loaded troops or 168 short tons), 237 Lighter, Amphibious, Self-Propelled (LARC) for cargo and personnel, and a Lighter, Beach Discharge (BDL) for roll-on/roll-off type cargo.[15] The Transportation Corps is now receiving the Lighter, Air Cushion Vehicle (LACV) to move cargo ashore quickly. The Navy's 40-knot Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) shows the direction the Army can take as well as it "will provide a major increase in assault flexibility, enabling our amphibious forces to land rapidly in areas where the enemy forces are weakest."[16] For the present, with proper planning and preparation the current watercraft fleet could do the job, as the British demonstrated with similar boats in their amphibious landing at San Carlos Strait in the Falklands campaign; they made a virtually unopposed landing some distance from their final objective of Port Stanley.[17]

At the same time the Army reorganizes its landing craft fleet, it must reorient the focus of its active and reserve water transport units from LOTS only to another of its "approved" missions, amphibious operations.[18] With such a change in emphasis, present-day Transportation terminal groups and brigades can operate in much the same way that the Engineer

Special Brigades did in the Southwest Pacific in World War II, as their organizations are similar. The terminal battalion (TOE 55-116) has heavy (LCU) and medium (LCM) boat and light and medium amphibian (LARC and LACV) companies to provide tactical and logistical lift. A heavy boat company with its 12 LCUs can, for example, carry 4,800 troops with their individual equipment in one lift. Additionally, a single LCU can transport three M-60 tanks. A terminal service company (breakbulk) normally works with the boat companies to unload cargo in over-the-beach and port operations.[19] The organization thus exists in the active and reserve Army to support amphibious operations, if its wartime missions are so structured and its units dedicated to the units most likely to conduct them.

With a doctrinal commitment to amphibious warfare, the revitalization of the landing craft fleet, and the redirection of the support structure, the Army finally must train and provide exercises for those forces most likely to participate in amphibious assaults. Based on the guidance of the Commanding General of Forces Command, Army battalions and companies have over the years received amphibious training at both of the Navy's Landing Force Training Commands. The Ranger battalions and certain Special Forces units have been given top priority for this training; second priority units include the 9th, 24th, 82d, and 101st Divisions.

In FY 83, 13 companies from the 18th Airborne Corps (7), the 82d Airborne (2), and 101st Airmobile/Air Assault (1) Divisions, and the 172d Infantry (2) and the 20th Engineer (1) Brigades completed the Army Amphibious Indoctrination Course at Little Creek Naval Base in Norfolk, Virginia. During the same period of time, three battalions of the 7th Infantry Division, one battalion of the 25th Infantry Division, and the 2-75th Infantry (Rangers) finished the Battalion Landing Operations Course at the Landing Force Training Command, Pacific, in Coronado, California. Twenty companies from the same units, including the 1-75th Infantry (Rangers) and the 209th MP Battalion, will train at Little Creek in FY 84, and five battalions will train at Coronado.[20] Although the right units are obviously learning amphibious techniques, the process must be taken several steps further. First, commanders must conduct amphibious training, not only as adventure training, but as a serious part of their missions. And, second, as a minimum, brigade-sized organizations must gain proficiency as landing forces.[21] Such a training package should insure that expertise in amphibious warfare exists in the Army today.

Once Army units have gained proficiency in amphibious warfare, they must participate in joint exercises so that they can learn to operate with the other Services. At present, the major joint, amphibious exercise is CINCLANT's SOLID SHIELD, an exercise in which there is generally Army participation. As

the airborne drop by a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division in SOLID SHIELD 81 illustrates, the Army has apparently "indicated that its primary commitment to any joint force landing on a hostile shore would be its sole airborne division and a few supporting units, nothing more, nothing less." In that particular exercise, only two companies of the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry had an opportunity to conduct a helicopter assault with the Marines from the U. S. S. Guam.[22] In JADE TIGER 83, a CENTCOM exercise held in November and December 1983, only a Marine MAU actually landed in Oman.[23] If the Army is to be serious about amphibious operations, it must take every opportunity to participate in actual landings.

With proper planning and doctrinal redirection, the Army has the capability in the long-term to commit its forces and assets to amphibious warfare. Strategic sealift is improving, and the tactical watercraft fleet and the soldiers who operate it can be reoriented from LOTS only to amphibious assaults as well. With training, modernization, and participation in joint amphibious exercises, the Army can conduct amphibious operations as well in the future as it did in the past. Nonetheless, while the reorientation is on-going, the Army must be prepared to respond to contingencies with little notice. As URGENT FURY showed, the Rangers are at the present time best able to respond to such crises requiring an amphibious assault.

CHAPTER III

RANGERS, SPEARHEADS OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

The U. S. Army Rangers are ideally suited to the conduct of amphibious warfare. Originally conceived as mounted troops to protect the frontiers of South Carolina and Georgia from Indians, the modern Rangers were patterned in 1942 after the British Commandos, formed to conduct naval raids on the German installations on the continent of Europe.[1] Reactivated in 1974 as "elite, light infantry" in the words of then Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, the 1st and 2d Battalions (Ranger), 75th Infantry are "specially trained and organized to conduct decentralized and limited independent combat operations anywhere in the world."[2] As a result, the Rangers are the Army's best candidate in the short term to spearhead amphibious assaults and participate in other joint operations such as URGENT FURY.

Contrary to standard accounts and even to the record of Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. who recommended the activation of Rangers in Ireland in 1942 and chose their name, South Carolinians and not Major Robert Rogers first used Rangers by 1715 at the time of the Yamasee War to guard the frontiers against Indians. A small body of these mounted provincials met General Oglethorpe and the first settlers of

Georgia when they landed near Savannah in 1733.[3] Interestingly enough, Major Rogers and his Rangers used whale boats for reconnaissance and raiding operations on Lake George during the French and Indian War.[4] The pattern for amphibious operations was thus set very early in the history of the Rangers.

In World War II, the Rangers, organized into six battalions by the end of the war, spearheaded every major amphibious assault in the Mediterranean and Europe and led the way for the landings at Leyte as well. Colonel William O. Darby's 1st Battalion set the standard for amphibious assaults in TORCH, the invasion of North Africa. As a part of the Center Task Force's plan to envelop the port of Oran, Algeria, his Rangers quickly seized the port of Arzew and its major coastal defense, Fort du Nord. After the French had capitulated, Darby wrote "a new book on amphibious landings". On the beaches at Arzew, his soldiers "made day landings with opposed fire; silent night landings; opposed night landings; against cliffs, on beaches, alongside piers."[5] Subsequently, the 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions of the Ranger Force spearheaded the landings against the ports of Gela and Licata in Sicily and Salerno and Anzio in Italy.[6] The 2d and 5th Battalions under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James Rudder both landed at Omaha Beach and scaled the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc to destroy a battery of 6.1-inch guns.[7] Finally, the 6th Battalion comprised part of the advance force for the General Douglas

MacArthur's invasion of Leyte, Philippine Islands, in October 1944. Companies of the battalion seized three islands that guarded the approaches to Leyte Gulf. The battalion also took part in the landings at Lingayen Gulf in January 1945.[8] In World War II, the Rangers proved their worth as elite, amphibious units.

With a heritage of success in making amphibious assaults, the present-day Rangers, because of their doctrine and capabilities, are able to perform a variety of special operations, including amphibious landings. In its Table of Organization and Equipment, the Ranger battalion is charged "To plan and conduct special military operationn [sic] in support of United States policy and objectives." At Level 1--604 officers and men--it "uses air, water, foot mobility, and parachute delivery when required to conduct raids, ambushes, and attacks against key targets in enemy territory." Rangers are doctrinally prepared to "accomplish extraordinary tasks by operating at levels in excess of normal expectation for relatively short periods of time in a highly disciplined environment."[9] Their ability to infiltrate into an area of operations and, in keeping with their heritage, conduct "special commando-type operations", will possibly allow them to bypass enemy resistance and hit vulnerable areas. Finally, since Rangers are most proficient in decentralized and independent operations and "habitually" operate in joint task

forces, joint, amphibious assaults will allow them to exploit these special strengths under almost any circumstance.[10]

Because the doctrine of the Ranger battalions dictates that they must be prepared to conduct amphibious assaults, they are organized and equipped for the mission. The heart of their capability is that the organic personnel and equipment, including only two one-quarter ton trucks, is transportable by both air and assault landing craft.[11] Although their fire power and logistical sustainability suffer, their lightness facilitates quick reaction and deployment in the event of a crisis. Eleven C141 transport aircraft can lift an entire Ranger battalion, which, if deployed on 18-hour notice from an East Coast base, can arrive at a Remote Marshaling Base (REMAB) in Turkey, for example, in 37 hours.[12] At such a REMAB, the Rangers could then linkup with prepositioned landing craft, await the arrival of LARCs or LACVs by air (C5) or LCUs or LCMs by sea (SEABEE or LASH), or utilize landing craft available from U. S. Navy amphibious ships. Three LCM-8s or two LCUs could put one entire battalion ashore should that prove necessary. Additionally, the Rangers could make a tactical jump as they did in Grenada or even fly ashore aboard helicopters, if they are available. The Ranger battalions clearly offer a wide range of alternatives for joint employment because of their organization and quick reaction time.

The organization and reaction time of the Rangers make them the Army's logical choice to meet the most probable types

of conflicts at the low end of the threat spectrum. Secretary Weinberger acknowledged this likelihood in his Annual Report:

> The Reagan Administration recognizes the increased need to respond to threats at the lower end of the spectrum and to conduct peacekeeping operations. Our revitalization program includes important force structure increases, including steps to reverse a decade of neglect of our Special Operations Forces (SOF).[13]

General Meyer echoed these same thoughts when he testified before Congress that these Special Operations Forces, which include the Rangers,

> provide an essential capability to conduct operations in low-intensity conflict environments marked by terrorism, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. They can keep major conflict from erupting and help us and our friends by countering threats before they mature into greater concerns.[14]

In a larger conflict, in Southwest Asia, for example, the Rangers may be able to assist the Marines in securing landing sites for follow-on or LOTS operations by other Army units. The amphibious capability of the Rangers makes them a flexible force to respond to crises across the spectrum of conflict.

As with the Army at large, training and exercises involving amphibious landings are paramount for the Ranger battalions to develop and maintain proficiency in amphibious techniques and to function smoothly with the Marines and Navy. Given top priority now by Forces Command, both Ranger battalions must continue to train at the Landing Force Training Commands. Ideally, the two battalions should take the Battalion Landing Operations Course together. During the

current FY, the 2-75th will train at Coronado, and three companies of the 1-75th will take the Army Amphibious Indoctrination Course at Little Creek.[15] As a result of these courses and unit training, the Ranger units should be among the best trained amphibious forces in the Army. Furthermore, they both now have the practical, combat experience of Grenada upon which to draw. Not only was this a joint operation, but 150 Rangers used Navy CH-46 helicopters to evacuate students from the beach.[16] A solid foundation has been established for cooperation between the Marines and the Rangers. Ranger participation in landings during SOLID SHIELD and other exercises such as JADE TIGER in Southwest Asia should enhance joint capability.

The Rangers provide the best force in the short-term to perform an amphibious assault, particularly if the contingency is at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Ranger battalions are doctrinally prepared to respond within eighteen hours to crises. They are organized and equipped for strategic deployment with limited aircraft and are able and trained to conduct amphibious assaults from both Army and Navy landing craft. As Colonel Darby himself told his troops again and again, "the outfit that can slip up on the enemy and stun him with shock and surprise--that is the outfit that will win battles--and that is the outfit I want."[17] The Rangers today are in such outfits, and amphibious warfare provides them a means to win battles.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The leaders of the Army must reconsider the value of amphibious warfare in future conflicts regardless of the size. Building on the lessons of World War II and Grenada and analyzing the possible scenarios, the Army must in good faith meet its responsibilities for amphibious operations as spelled out in JCS Pub 2. Amphibious doctrine must be incorporated into Army thinking alongside more glamorous topics as Airland Battle. The fleet of Army landing craft must be revitalized and modernized not only for the LOTS mission but also to provide lift for troops and equipment onto a hostile shore. In addition to those in England and Okinawa, landing craft for Army use must be prepositioned in other likely theaters of operation such as the Indian Ocean. For other areas of the world, landing craft, depending on size, can either be lifted aboard aircraft or transports such as the LASH or SEEBEE to staging areas where they can linkup with troops deployed by air. Simultaneously, the priority of the mission of Transportation waterborne units must be reoriented to include not only LOTS but amphibious assaults as well. Finally, the units most likely to take part in landings in the future must

conduct amphibious training and participate in exercises designed to prepare them for a future conflict.

A major doctrinal shift in the Army that makes amphibious operations suitable, feasible, and acceptable will not be accomplished in the near-term. In the meantime, the 1st and 2d Battalions (Ranger), 75th Infantry give the Army a trump card. They are organized, trained, and equipped to undertake amphibious assaults. Furthermore, they are doctrinally committed to such operations and are the most suited for the most probable conflicts on the lower end of the conflict spectrum. As were the Rangers in World War II, the Rangers of today are ready to lead the way as the spearheads for amphibious assaults.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Cecil Stack, "Grenada," Soldiers, January 1984, p. 39; "Jumping Into a Hot DZ at 500 Ft.," Army Times, 14 November 1983, p. 2; "Marines on Grenada Met Light Resistance", Army Times, 28 November 1983, p. 29.

2. "JCS 'Deeply Involved' in Grenada Planning," Army Times, 28 November 1983, p. 30.

3. Albert N. Garland, "Amphibious Warfare: Where Does the Army Stand?" Military Review, September 1982, p. 22, 26.

4. "JCS", p. 30.

Chapter II

1. U. S. Depart. of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: 1979), p. 26-27; U. S. Depart. of the Army, Operational Terms and Graphics, FM 101-5-1 (Washington: 1980), p. 1-8.

2. Dean E. Painter, "The Army and Amphibious Warfare," Military Review, August 1965, p. 36-37.

3. Blanche D. Coll, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment (Washington: 1958), p. 361, 387, 390.

4. Louis C. Menetrey, "Statement," U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military Posture and HR 5968 (HR 6030) Department of Defense Authorizations for Appropriations for FY 83, Hearings (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982), pt. 5, p. 811; John O. Marsh, Jr. and Edward C. Meyer, "Joint Statement," U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1984, Hearings (Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983), pt. 1, p. 503.

5. U. S. Dept. of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington: 1983), p. 195; James W. Penny, "The Army's Amphibious Warfare Capability," Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: 1982, p. 23.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JCS Pub 2 (Washington: 1974), p. 20.

7. Garland, p. 26; Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record, Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1976), p. 7.

8. Annual Report, p. 124.

9. U. S. Dept. of the Army, Operations, FM 100-5 (Washington: 1982), p. 16-2.

10. Marsh and Meyer, p. 526-527.

11. Annual Report, p. 191.

12. James L. Holloway III, "Sealift", U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1983, p. 35-36; Annual Report, p. 204; Garland, p. 27.

13. Holloway, p. 34.

14. U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Transportation School, U. S. Army Trans-Hydro Craft Study 1975-1985, Final Draft (Fort Eustis, Vir.: 1973), p. 1, 3; U. Army Logistics Management Center, Study of US Army Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS) Operations and System Development, Vol 1. (Fort Lee, Vir.: 1982), p. 149, 180.

15. Ibid., p. 99.

16. Annual Report, p. 154.

17. Riley T. Griffin, "Organization and Employment of the Army Landing Force," Unpublished Student Research Paper, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1980, p.12.

18. Trans-Hydro Craft Study, p. 2.

19. U. S. Dept. of the Army, Staff Officers Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistic Data Extracts of Nondivisional Tables of Organization and Equipment (Washington: 1977), p. 27-14, 27-15; Griffin, p. 13.

20. LOTS, p. 108-117; letter from C. F. Homan to James M. Johnson, 13 February 1984; letter from R. H. Kayser to James M. Johnson, 27 January 1984; letter from Wayne W. Lombardo to James M. Johnson, n.d. (February 1984); Penny, p. 74-75, 84; Matt Glasgow, "Hitting the Beach: Infantrymen Train in Amphibious Warfare," Soldiers, December 1978, p. 47.

21. Penny, p. 133-134.

22. Garland, p. 22; Gary L. Kieffer, "Solid Shield," Soldiers, November 1981, p. 9, 10.

23. Annual Report, p. 204.

Chapter III

1. Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier: 1670-1732 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1929), p. 143, 187, 189, 190, 236-237; M. Eugene Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966), p. 114; James M. Johnson, "'Not a Single Soldier in the Province': The Military Establishment of Georgia and the Coming of the American Revolution," Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1980, p. 30; Larry E. Ivers, British Drums on the Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1974), p. 11-16, 28, 53, 61; L. K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York: E.

P. Dutton and Company, 1954), p. 40.

2. Charles D. McMillin, "Roles and Missions of Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces in Contingency Operations", Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 1982, p. 40; Dept. of the Army, The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger), FM 7-20 (Washington: April 1978, with Change 1, 1980, p. 1-3.

3. Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies (Cambridge: The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), p. 26-27; McMillin, p. 11.

4. Robert Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers (Ann Arbor: University Microfilm, Inc., 1966), p. 1, 11-12, 109-112, 138.

5. James Altieri, Darby's Rangers: An Illustrated Portrayal of the Original Rangers (Durham, N.C.: The Seeman Printery, Inc., 1945), p. 32; George F. Howe, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington: 1957), p. 49, 205-206; James Altieri, The Spearheaders (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960), p. 172.

6. Ibid., p. 249; Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy (Washington: 1965), p. 125, 136-139; Martin Blumenson, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino (Washington: 1969), p. 33, 358.

7. Henry S. Glassman, "Lead the Way, Rangers": A History of the Fifth Ranger Battalion (Markt Grafing, Bavaria: 1945), p. 20-25; Ronald L. Lane, Rudder's Rangers (Manassas, Vir.: Ranger Associates, 1979), p. 72.

8. M. Hamlin Cannon, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Leyte: The Return to the Philippines (Washington: 1954), p. 28, 54-55; Robert Ross Smith, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Triumph in the Philippines (Washington: 1963), p. 87, 561-562.

9. Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, Organization, Missions, and Command and Control of Special Forces and Ranger Units in the 1980's (U) (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: 1979), p. 55; U. S. Dept. of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment, TOE 07085H400, Change 1, "Ranger Infantry Battalion" (Washington: 30 May 1974), p. 1172, 1173, 1215.

10. The Infantry Battalion, p. 1-3, I-2; McMillin, p. 76.

11. TOE, line #, Z94109; p. 1172, 1173, 1215.

12. McMillin, p. 44, 57, 72; U. S. , p. I-4.

13. Annual Report, p. 37-38.

14. Marsh and Meyer, p. 559.

15. Letter, Homan to Johnson.

16. "Jumping," p. 2.

17. Altieri, The Spearheaders, p. 188.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Altieri, James. Darby's Rangers: An Illustrated Portrayal of the Original Rangers. Durham, N. C.: The Seeman Printery, Inc., 1945.

_____. The Spearheaders. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960.

Barbey, Daniel E. MacArthur's Amphibious Navy. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1969.

Beaumont, Roger A. Military Elites. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1974.

Binkin, Martin and Record, Jeffrey. Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here? Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976.

Blumenson, Martin. United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Salerno to Cassino. Washington: 1969.

Brown, Clarence R. "Battlefield Sustainment of U. S. Army Special Operations Forces (Special Forces and Rangers) During Mid-Intensity Short-Duration Conflict." Master of Military Arts and Science thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.:1983.

Brown, Ronald B. "What It's All About." U. S. Army Aviation Digest, March 1982, p. 28-29.

Cannon, M. Hamlin. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. Washington: 1954.

Cohen, Eliot A. Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies. Cambridge: The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978.

Coll, Blanche D., Keith, Jean E., and Rosenthal, Herbert H. United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services: The Corps of Engineers: Troops and Equipment. Washington: 1958.

Commander, Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force. Commander Joint Task Force 140 SOLID SHIELD Final After Action Report (U). Key West, Fla.: 1980. CONFIDENTIAL

Commander in Chief, Atlantic. Exercise SOLID SHIELD 78 Final After Action Report (U). Norfolk, Va.: 1978. CONFIDENTIAL

_____. Letter of Instruction, Joint Exercise SOLID SHIELD 78 (U). Norfolk, Va.: 1977. CONFIDENTIAL

_____. Exercise SOLID SHIELD 79 Final Report (U). Norfolk, Va.: 1980. CONFIDENTIAL

_____. CINCLANT EXOPLAN 2081 (U). Norfolk, Va.: 1981. CONFIDENTIAL

_____. CINCLANT Exercise Operation Plan 2083--SOLID SHIELD 83 (U). Norfolk, Va.: 1982. CONFIDENTIAL.

Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary. 1971 ed. S.v. "Ranger."

Cook, Graeme. Commandos in Action. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1973.

Crane, Verner W. The Southern Frontier: 1670-1732. Durham: Duke University Press, 1929.

Cuneo, John R. Robert Rogers of the Rangers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Darby, William O. and Baumer, William H. We Led the Way. San Rafael, Cal.: Presidio Press, 1980.

Darragh, Shaun M. "Rangers and Special Forces: 'Two Edges of the Same Dagger'." Army, December 1977, p. 14-19.

Garland, Albert N. "Amphibious Warfare: Where Does the Army Stand?" Military Review, September 1982, p. 21-27.

_____ and Smyth, Howard McGaw. United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. Washington: 1965.

Glasgow, Matt. "Hitting the Beach: Infantrymen Train in Amphibious Warfare." Soldiers, December 1978, p. 45-49.

Glassman, Henry S. "Lead the Way, Rangers": A History of the Fifth Ranger Battalion. Markt Grafing, Bavaria, 1945.

Godson, Susan H. Viking of Assault: Admiral John Lesslie Hall, Jr., and Amphibious Warfare. Washington: University Press of America, Inc., 1982.

Griffin, Riley T. "Organization and Employment of the Army Landing Force." Unpublished Student Research Paper. U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I.: 1980.

Harrison, Gordon A. United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations: Cross-Channel Attack. Washington: 1951.

Heilbrunn, Otto. Warfare in the Enemy's Rear. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Holloway, James L. III. "Sealift." U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1983, p. 28-37.

Howe, George F. United States Army in World War II: The

Mediterranean Theater of Operations: Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. Washington: 1957.

Ivers, Larry E. British Drums on the Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1974.

"JCS 'Deeply Involved' in Grenada Planning." Army Times, 28 November 1983, p. 30.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). JCS Pub. 2. Washington: 1974.

Johnson, James M. "'Not a Single Soldier in the Province': The Military Establishment of Georgia and the Coming of the American Revolution." Ph. D. dissertation, Duke University: 1980.

"Jumping into a Hot DZ at 500 Ft." Army Times, 14 November 1983, p. 1-2, 10, 66.

Kieffer, Gary L. "Solid Shield". Soldiers, November 1981, p. 6-11.

King, Michael J. William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1981.

Ladd, James. Commandos and Rangers of World War II. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978.

Lane, Ronald L. Rudder's Rangers. Manassas, Va.: Ranger Ranger Associates, 1979.

Letter from C. F. Homan to James M. Johnson, 13 February 1984.

Letter from R. H. Kayser to James M. Johnson, 27 January 1984.

Letter from Wayne W. Lombardo to James M. Johnson, n.d. (February 1984).

Mahon, John K. and Danysh, Romana. Infantry: Part I: Regular Army. Washington: 1972.

"Marines on Grenada Met Light Resistance." Army Times, 28 November 1983, p. 29.

MacMaster, Fitzhugh. Soldiers and Uniforms: South Carolina Military Affairs, 1760-1775. Columbia, S. C.: The University of South Carolina Press, 1971.

McMillin, Charles D. "Roles and Missions of Airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces in Contingency Operations." Master of Art and Science thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: 1982.

Paddock, Alfred H., Jr. US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1982.

Painter, Dean E. "The Army and Amphibious Warfare." Military Review, August 1965, p. 36-40.

Penny, James W. "The Army's Amphibious Warfare Capability." Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U. S. Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: 1982.

Rogers, Robert. Journals of Major Robert Rogers. Ann Arbor: University Microfilm, Inc., 1966.

Sirmans, M. Eugene. Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966.

Sligar, Norman F. "Ranger Battalions: Proficiency at the Cutting Edge." Unpublished Student Research Paper. U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I.: 1974.

Smith, Robert Ross. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Triumph in the Philippines. Washington: 1963.

Stack, Cecil. "Grenada." Soldiers, January 1984, p. 37-44.

Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College. Organization, Missions and Command and Control of Special Forces and Ranger Units in the 1980's (U). Carlisle Barracks, Penn.: 1979. SECRET NOFORN

Truscott, L. K. Jr. Command Missions: A Personal Story. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1954.

U. S. Central Command. JADE TIGER 83 Final After Action Report (U). MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.: 1983. SECRET NOFORN

U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Military Posture and HR 5968 (HR 6030) Department of Defense Authorizations for Appropriations for FY 83. Hearings. Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Office, 1982. Pt. 5.

_____. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1984. Hearings. Washington: U. S. Govt. Print. Office, 1983. Pt. 2.

U. S. Dept. of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington: 1979.

_____. Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1984. Washington: 1983.

U. S. Dept. of the Army. Army Forces in Amphibious Operations. FM 31-12. Washington: 1963.

_____. The Infantry Battalion (Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger). FM 7-20. Washington:

April 1978, with Change 1, 1980.

_____. Operational Terms and Graphics. FM 101-5-1. Washington: 1980.

_____. Operations. FM 100-5. Washington: 1982.

_____. Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistic Data Extracts of Nondivisional Tables of Organization and Equipment. FM 101-10-2. Washington: 1977.

_____. Table of Organization and Equipment. TOE 07085H400, Change 1, "Ranger Infantry Battalion". Washington: 30 May 1974.

U. S. Dept. of the Army Logistics Management Center. Study of US Army Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS) Operations and System Development. Vol. 1. Fort Lee, Vir.: 1982

U. S. Dept. of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, Transportation School. U. S. Army Trans-Hydro Craft Study 1975-1985. Final Draft. Fort Eustis, Vir.: 1973.

U. S. Navy Dept. Doctrine for Amphibious Operations. FM 31-11. Washington: 1967.

U. S. Navy Dept. Landing Force Training Command, Pacific. BLOC Training. San Diego, Cal.: n.d.

Ware, Fletcher K. "The Airborne Division and a Strategic Concept." Military Review, March 1976, p. 23-33.

US Army ; Amphibious Operations
JAMES M. JOHNSON
MAJOR USA

KEY WORDS

1. United States Army
2. Amphibious operations
3. Amphibious warfare
4. Joint operations
5. Rangers
6. Amphibious landings
7. Amphibious doctrine
8. Special Operations Forces
9. Contingency operations
10. Landing forces